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We introduce and axiomatize dynamic variational preferences, the dynamic version of the varia-
tional preferences we axiomatized in [21], which generalize the multiple priors preferences of Gilboa
and Schmeidler [9], and include the Multiplier Preferences inspired by robust control and ﬁrst used
in macroeconomics by Hansen and Sargent (see [11]), as well as the classic Mean Variance Prefer-
ences of Markovitz and Tobin. We provide a condition that makes dynamic variational preferences
time consistent, and their representation recursive. This gives them the analytical tractability
needed in macroeconomic and ﬁnancial applications. A corollary of our results is that Multiplier
Preferences are time consistent, but Mean Variance Preferences are not.
JEL classiﬁcation: C61; D81
Keywords: Ambiguity Aversion; Model Uncertainty; Recursive Utility; Robust Control; Time
Consistency1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the Multiple Priors (MP) model agents rank acts h using the criterion
V (h) ≡ inf
p∈C
Ep [u(h)], (1)
where C is a closed and convex subset of the set ∆ of all probabilities on states. This model has
been axiomatized by Gilboa and Schmeidler [9] with the goal of modeling ambiguity averse agents,
who exhibit the Ellsberg-type behavior ﬁrst observed in the seminal paper of Ellsberg [5].
The nonsingleton nature of C reﬂects the limited information available to agents, which may
not be enough to quantify their beliefs with a single probability, and is instead compatible with a
nonsingleton set C of probabilities.
On the other hand, the cautious attitude featured by MP agents can also be viewed as the result
of the eﬀect that an adversarial inﬂuence, which we may call “Nature,” has on the realizations of the
state. Under this view, Nature chooses a probability p over states with the objective of minimizing
agents’ utility, conditional on their choice of an act and under the constraint that the probability
p has to be chosen in a ﬁxed set C. This interpretation of the MP model provides an intuitive
notion of ambiguity aversion, which can be regarded as the agents’ diﬃdence for any lack of precise
deﬁnition of the uncertainty involved in a choice, something that provides room for the malevolent
inﬂuence of Nature.1
In a recent paper, [21], we extended the MP representation by generalizing Nature’s constraint.
Speciﬁcally, in our extension the constraint on Nature is given by a cost c(p) associated with the
choice of probability, and agents rank acts according to the criterion:
V (h) ≡ inf
p∈∆
(Ep [u(h)] + c(p)), (2)
where c is a closed and convex function on ∆. Preferences represented by (2) are called varia-
tional preferences (VP), and the function c is their ambiguity index. In [21] we axiomatize the
representation (2) and we discuss in detail its ambiguity interpretation.
The VP representation generalizes the MP representation, which is the special case where there
is an inﬁnite cost for choosing outside the set C, with the cost being constant (and hence, without
loss of generality, zero) inside that set. In other words, the cost for Nature in the MP model is
given by the indicator function δC : ∆ → [0,∞] of C,d e ﬁned as
δC (p) ≡
(
0 if p ∈ C,
∞ if p/ ∈ C,
(3)
and it is immediate to see that
inf
p∈∆
(Ep [u(h)] + δC (p)) = inf
p∈C
Ep [u(h)].
The notion of ambiguity aversion has found an important application in the last years in the
literature, pioneered by Hansen and Sargent (see, e.g., [11] and [12] for details and references),
that applies the idea of robust control to agents’ choices in macroeconomic models. While the
initial deﬁnition of robust control was diﬀerent from that of ambiguity aversion, the intuition is
1As Hart, Modica, and Schmeidler [13, p. 352] write “In Gilboa and Schmeidler [9] it is shown that preferences ...
are represented by functionals of the form f 7→ minq∈Q
S
s u(f (s))q (s), for some closed convex set Q ⊂ ∆(S).S o
the ambiguity averse decision maker behaves ‘as if’ there were an opponent who could partially inﬂuence occurence
of states to his disadvantage (i.e., think of the opponent as choosing q ∈ Q).” This informed opponent interpretation
has found support in some recent experimental ﬁndings in the psychological and neuroscience literatures (see [18],
[19], [17], and [27]).
1closely related: an agent prefers a robust control if he is not conﬁdent that his (probabilistic)
model of the uncertainty is correct, and so he wants to avoid the possibility that a small error in
the formulation of the stochastic environment produces a large loss. Ambiguity aversion comes up
because the agents’ information is too limited to be represented by a single probabilistic model.
In the multiplier preferences model, the most important choice model used in this macroeco-
nomic literature (see [11]), the constraint on Nature is represented by a cost c based on a reference
probability q ∈ ∆: Nature can deviate away from q, but the larger the deviation, the higher the
cost. In particular, this cost is assumed to be proportional to the relative entropy R(pkq) between
the chosen probability p and the reference probability q;t h a ti s ,
c(p) ≡ θR(pkq),
where θ>0. Multiplier preferences are, therefore, the special case of variational preferences given
by
V (h) ≡ inf
p∈∆
(Ep [u(h)] + θR(pkq)),
and their analytical tractability is important in deriving optimal policies.
Even though the motivation behind multiplier preferences is similar to that used for MP pref-
erences, formally multiplier preferences are not MP preferences. In fact, in [21] we show that
they are an example of divergence preferences, a special class of variational preferences featuring
tractable cost functions, but which are not MP preferences. Variational preferences are, therefore,
the generalization needed in order to encompass both MP and multiplier preferences, as discussed
at length in [21].
In view of applications, however, the static analysis of [21] is insuﬃcient and a dynamic exten-
sion is required. This is the purpose of the present paper, in which we introduce and axiomatize
dynamic variational preferences.
The ﬁrst observation to make is that, while in a static environment acts are functions from
states to consequences, in a dynamic environment they are functions from times and states to
consequences. We impose on acts the usual measurability conditions ensuring that agents’ choices
are consistent with the information they have. As a result, agents’ evaluations are conditional to
time and state, and they are modelled by a family of (conditional) preferences %t,ω indexed by time
and state pairs (t,ω). In the main results of the paper, Proposition 1 and Theorem 1, we provide
necessary and suﬃcient conditions guaranteeing that agents’ preferences at time t are represented
by the preference functional Vt (h):Ω → R given by
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Gt

 + ct (p|Gt)

, (4)
and we show what restrictions on ct guarantee time consistency.2 Under time consistency the rep-
resentation (4) becomes recursive, and so it has the analytical tractability required in applications.
Besides tractability, time consistency has also an intuitive appeal. In fact, suppose that two acts
are the same in every contingency up to the present period, and the ﬁrst is preferred to the second
according to the conditional preference in the next period in every state. Then time consistency
requires that the ﬁrst act should be preferred to the second in the present period. Equivalently,
think of a plan as a sequence of conditional choic e s ,s ot h a tt h ec h o i c eo fap l a ni nt h ec u r r e n t
period includes a plan of choices in all future periods, conditional on all future contingencies. Then,
an agent is time consistent if he never formulates a plan of future choices that he wants to revise
later in some event that is conceivable today.
2Here β is a discount factor and Gt represents the information available to the agents at time t.
21 . 1 T h eN o - G a i nC o n d i t i o na n dB a y e s i a nU p d a t i n g
Our present work extends to the VP setting the recent dynamic version of the MP model provided
by Epstein and Schneider [6]. These authors give a condition, called rectangularity, that guarantees
time consistency of MP preferences. Since rectangularity is a restriction on the sets of probabilities
from which Nature can select at every time and state, it is natural that our corresponding condition
is formulated as a restriction on cost functions.
Speciﬁcally, our condition is given by (11) of Theorem 1. To facilitate the exposition, we present
it in a simpliﬁed form, dropping the time index (the reader may think of this as the condition for
the two-period version of the model). The agent has a partition G over the set of possible states
(see the picture at p. 7). Nature has a cost cΩ in the ﬁrst period, so that cΩ(q) is Nature’s cost of
choosing the probability q over the states. To each event G in this partition a new, second period,
cost cG is associated. The announced condition requires that:








ω∈G q(ω), β is the discount factor, and
qG(ω) ≡
(
q(ω)/q(G) if ω ∈ G,
0 otherwise.
(6)
The condition has a simple interpretation. The choice of probability by Nature over two periods
can be thought of as consisting of two steps. The ﬁrst period choice is a choice of probability over
t h ee v e n t st h a tr e a l i z ei nt h eﬁrst period. The second period choice is a choice of probability over
states in every event, conditional on that event.
Nature can make this choice in a time consistent way: choose q in the ﬁrst period, pay the
appropriate cost cΩ(q), wait for the realization of the second period event G, do nothing, pay
nothing, and get the probability qG on the states in the event G. The total cost of this is the term
in the l.h.s. of (5).
Alternatively, Nature can achieve the same result in a time inconsistent way, with total cost
given by the r.h.s. of (5). Nature can choose today a probability p that induces the same probability
over events in the second period as q does. This constraint is described by the condition p(G)=
q(G) for every event G. Nature pays for its choice p the appropriate cost, which is the term
cΩ(p) in the r.h.s. of (5). After the realization of the event G, the probability over states in that
event would be pG. Nature can now change the conditional probability to qG, and again pay the
appropriate cost, represented by the term cG(qG) in the r.h.s. of (5). Overall, in this second more
indirect way, Nature achieves the same result as in the ﬁrst choice: a probability q(G) of every
event G in the ﬁrst period, and a conditional probability qG if G obtains.
Condition (5) requires that this second, time inconsistent and convoluted, choice is not less
costly for Nature. A simple way of stating our main result is therefore the following: A decision
maker is dynamically consistent if and only if (he thinks that) Nature is dynamically consistent.3
In view of all this, we call (5), and more generally (11) of Theorem 1, a “no-gain condition.”
We will formally prove that the no-gain condition generalizes rectangularity, and it coincides with
it when cost functions are indicators δC.
3This dynamically consistent behavior of Nature reminds of the Principle of Least Action, a fundamental idea
in theoretical physics, which for example lies at the heart of both classical and quantum mechanics. In its meta-
theoretic form, this principle says that Nature is thrifty in all its actions, and so it acts in the simplest possible way.
The dynamic consistency of Nature can be viewed as a form of this important meta-theoretic principle because (5)
describes the simplest possible way for Nature to end up with a probability q(G) of every event G in the ﬁrst period,
and a conditional probability qG if G obtains.
3Equation (5) provides a link between cost functions in diﬀerent periods. One important aspect
of this link is that in the second period the probability over states conditional on the event G is the
conditional probability qG as deﬁned by (6), namely according to Bayes’ Rule. This link extends
to variational preferences the connection between time consistency and Bayes’ Rule.
As well known, Subjective Expected Utility preferences are time consistent if and only if their
subjective beliefs are updated according to Bayes’ Rule. This result is generalized in [6] to MP
preferences by showing that they are time consistent if and only if their sets of subjective beliefs
are rectangular and updating is done belief by belief (prior by prior in the terminology of the MP
model) according to Bayes’ Rule. Our Theorem 1 further generalizes all these results by showing
that variational preferences are time consistent if and only if their cost functions satisfy the no-gain
condition and updating is done according to Bayes’ Rule.
Moreover, the recursive structure of the no-gain condition makes it possible to construct by
backward induction cost functions that satisfy it. This is shown by Theorem 2, which thus provides
a way to construct via (4) examples of variational preferences that are time consistent.
Some papers have recently studied related issues, in particular dynamic aspects of the MP
model. We already mentioned Epstein and Schneider [6], which is in turn closely related to Wang
[31]. Some aspects of their work have been extended by Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci
[8] and Hayashi [15]. More recently, Hanany and Klibanoﬀ [10] proposed a dynamic version of the
MP model that is dynamically consistent but does not satisfy Consequentialism, while Siniscalchi
[28] focused on dynamic MP models that relax Dynamic Consistency. Finally, Ozdenoren and Peck
[25] have studied some dynamic games against Nature that lead to ambiguity averse behavior, thus
providing a game-theoretic underpinning of the game against Nature interpretation of ambiguity
we discussed above and in [21].
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the setup and notation, Section 3
presents the axioms needed for our derivation, whereas Section 4 contains the main results of the
paper. Section 5 illustrates the main results with two important classes of variational preferences,
the multiple priors preferences of Gilboa and Schmeidler [9] and the multiplier preferences of Hansen
and Sargent [11]. Finally, Section 6 illustrates the analytical tractability of dynamic variational
preferences by showing their convenient diﬀerential properties. All proofs are collected in the
Appendix.
2S e t u p
2.1 Information
Time is discrete and varies over T ≡ {0,1,...,T}. In our results we model information as an event
tree {Gt}t∈T ,g i v e na n dﬁxed throughout, which is deﬁned on a ﬁnite space Ω. The elements of
this tree are partitions Gt of Ω consisting of non-empty sets, with G0 ≡ {Ω}, Gt+1 ﬁner than Gt for
all t<T,a n dGT ≡ {{ω} : ω ∈ Ω};i np a r t i c u l a r ,Gt (ω) is the element of Gt that contains ω.F o r
non-triviality, we assume T,|Ω| ≥ 2.
The main interpretation we have in mind for this standard modelling of information is as
follows. Given an underlying (and possibly unveriﬁable) state space S,e n d o w e dw i t haσ-algebra
Σ, observations are generated by a sequence of random variables {Zt}t>0 taking values on ﬁnite
observation spaces Ωt. Each random variable Zt : S → Ωt is Σ-measurable and for convenience we




t=1 Ωt is denoted by Ω,a n di t sp o i n t sω =( ω1,...,ωT) are the possible
observation paths generated by the sequence {Zt}.G i v e nt ∈ T ,d e n o t eb y{ω1,...,ωt} the cylinder
{ω1}×···×{ ωt}×Ωt+1 ×···×ΩT.
The event tree {Gt} records the building up of observations and it is given by G0 ≡ {Ω},
Gt ≡ {{ω1,...,ωt} : ωτ ∈ Ωτ for each τ =1 ,...,t},
and GT ≡ {{ω} : ω ∈ Ω}. In other words, the atoms of the partition Gt are the observation paths
up to time t and they can be viewed as the nodes of the event tree {Gt}.
Denote by ∆(Ω) the set of all probability distributions p :2 Ω → [0,1]. The elements of ∆(Ω)
represent the agent’s subjective beliefs over the observation paths. Their conditional distributions
p(ωt+1,...,ωT | ω1,...,ωt) ≡
p(ω1,...,ωT)
p(ω1,...,ωt)
are called predictive distributions and they represent the agent’s (subjective) probability that
(ωt+1,...,ωT) will be observed after having observed (ω1,...,ωt).4 Using the standard notation
for conditional probabilities, the predictive distributions are given by the collection {p(·|G t)}t>0.
Observe that in the literature on MP preferences, the probabilities p :2 Ω → [0,1] are often
called priors and the conditional probabilities p(·|G t) are called the Bayesian updates of the
priors. This terminology is, however, a bit confusing as in Statistics priors are often probabilities
on parameters (and posteriors are their Bayesian updates given observations). Here no parametric
representation is assumed for the probabilities p :2 Ω → [0,1], and so we prefer not to use the term
prior for them.
We now illustrate these notions with few examples.
Example 1 Suppose that observations are given by heads and tails from a given coin. We can
set Ωt = {0,1} for each t =1 ,...,T,s ot h a tΩ = {0,1}
T is the sample space. A possible p ∈ ∆(Ω)
is the one that assigns equal probability to all observation paths ω;t h a ti s ,p(ω) ≡ 2−T for each





For example, if T =3 ,w eh a v eΩ = {0,1}
3 and Ω consists of 23 states. This case can be illustrated





























































and the above probability p is such that p(ω)=1 /8 for all ω ∈ Ω, while its predictive distributions
are:
p(ω3 | ω1,ω 2)=1 /2 and p(ω2,ω 3 | ω1)=1 /4.
N
4We write p(ω1,...,ω t) and (ωt+1,...,ωT) in place of p({ω1,...,ωt}) and Ω1 ×···×Ωt ×{ ωt+1}×···×{ ωT}.
5I nt h en e x te x a m p l e sw ea s s u m et h a tΩt = Z for all t,s ot h a tΩ = ZT. For instance, in the
previous example we had Z = {0,1}.
Example 2 Consider a p ∈ ∆(Ω) that makes the sequence {Zt} i.i.d., with common marginal





π (ωi) ∀ω ∈ Ω.
The predictive distributions are given by:




that is, p(ωt+1,...,ω T | ω1,...,ωt)=p(ωt+1,...,ωT). Hence, information is irrelevant for prediction.
N
Example 3 Consider a p ∈ ∆(Ω) that makes the sequence {Zt} exchangeable, i.e.,
p(ω1,...,ω T)=p(ωi1,...,ωiT) (7)
















i=1 ωi = l
´
is the probability of having l successes among t ∈ T trials. Some algebra














i=1 ωi and k =
PT
i=t+1 ωi. Because of exchangeability, only the quantities l and k
matter for the predictive distributions. Here information, as recorded by l and k, is relevant for
prediction. N
Example 4 Finally, suppose that p ∈ ∆(Ω) makes the sequence {Zt} a homogeneous Markov
chain with transition function π : Ωt−1 × 2Z → [0,1] for t ≥ 2,w h e r eπ(ωt−1,·):2 Z → [0,1] is
a probability measure on Z for each ωt−1 ∈ Ωt−1. Given an initial probability distribution π0 on
2Z, p is uniquely determined by π as follows:
p(ω) ≡ π0 (ω1)
T Y
i=2






Also in this Markov example information matters for prediction. In particular, (8) shows that here
the relevant information is given by ωt. N
62.2 Consumption Streams
The acts among which agents choose are here given by consumption processes. Formally, acts
are X-valued adapted processes of the form h =( h0,h 1,...,hT),w h e r ee a c hht : Ω → X is Gt-



































































































Denote by H the set of all acts; we equivalently write ht (ω) or h(t,ω) to denote consumption
at time t if ω obtains (and sometimes h(t,G) to denote consumption at time t if G ∈ Gt occurs).
Notice that in our ﬁnite setting acts can be regarded as functions deﬁned on
S
t∈T Gt,t h a ti s ,o n
the set of all nodes.
We can identify H with the set of all maps h : Ω → XT such that hτ (ω)=hτ (ω0) if Gτ (ω)=
Gτ (ω0); in this perspective h(ω) is the element (h0 (ω),h 1 (ω),...,hT (ω)) ∈ XT for any given ω.
For all α ∈ [0,1],a n da l lh,h0 ∈ H we set
(αh +( 1− α)h0)(t,ω) ≡ αh(t,ω)+( 1− α)h0 (t,ω) ∀(t,ω) ∈ T× Ω.
If the values of an act y ∈ H depend only on time but not on state, that is, for every ﬁxed t
y(t,ω)=y(t,ω0)=yt ∀ω,ω0 ∈ Ω,
w i t hal i t t l ea b u s eo fn o t a t i o nw ew r i t ey =( y0,y 1,...,yT) ∈ XT .M o r e o v e r ,i fy0 = ... = yT = x,
the act is called constant and, with another little abuse of notation, we denote it by x.
Example 5 Suppose as in Example 1 that Ω = {0,1}
T. A consumption process h =( h0,h 1,...,hT)
is such that:
h0 (ω)=h0 (ω0), ∀ω,ω0 ∈ Ω,
h1 (ω)=h1 (ω0), ∀ω,ω0 ∈ Ω with ω1 = ω0
1,
·· ·




In other words, h0 is a constant, h1 only depends on the ﬁrst observation, and ht only depends on
the ﬁrst t observations. N
72.3 Notation
We close by introducing some notation, which is usually a bit heavy in dynamic settings. If
p ∈ ∆(Ω),w ed e n o t eb yp|Gt its restriction to the algebra A(Gt) generated by Gt,a n db yp(·|G t)
the conditional probability given Gt.5 As we already observed, the conditional probabilities p(·|G t)
are called predictive distributions.
For all t ∈ T , ∆(Ω,Gt) denotes the set of all probabilities on A(Gt), hence ∆(Ω,Gt)=
©
p|Gt : p ∈ ∆(Ω)
ª
.I np a r t i c u l a r ,∆(Ω,GT)=∆(Ω).
For each E ∈ A(Gt),w es e t
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p(G) > 0 ∀G ∈ Gt : G ⊆ E
p(G)=0 ∀G ∈ Gt : G * E
)
.
Denoting by suppp the support {ω ∈ Ω : p(ω) > 0} of p ∈ ∆(Ω), for each subset E of Ω we have:
∆(E)={p ∈ ∆(Ω) : suppp ⊆ E} and ∆++ (E)={p ∈ ∆(Ω) : suppp = E}.
In particular, ∆(Gt (ω)) is the set of all predictive distributions that can be obtained by condi-
tioning on Gt (ω) from probabilities p ∈ ∆(Ω) such that p(Gt (ω)) > 0, while ∆++ (Gt (ω)) is the
subset of ∆(Gt (ω)) derived under the further condition that p ∈ ∆(Ω) be such that p(ω0) > 0 for
all ω0 ∈ Gt (ω).
Similarly, for each E ∈ A(Gt) we have
∆(E,Gt)=
©




p|Gt : p ∈ ∆++ (E)
ª
.
If the vector space M(Ω,Gt) of all measures on A(Gt) is endowed with the product topology,
then ∆++ (E,Gt) is the relative interior of the convex set ∆(E,Gt) (see Rockafellar [26], to which
we refer for the Convex Analysis terminology and notation).
3A x i o m s
Let the binary relations %t,ω on H represent the agent’s preferences at any time-state node. Next
are stated several properties (axioms) of the preference relation, which will be used in the sequel.
Axiom 1 (Conditional preference–CP) For each (t,ω) ∈ T× Ω:
(i) %t,ω coincides with %t,ω0 if Gt (ω)=Gt (ω0).
(ii) If h(τ,ω0)=h0 (τ,ω0) for all τ ≥ t and ω0 ∈ Gt (ω),t h e nh ∼t,ω h0.
(i) says that preferences orderings are “adapted” and allows to write %t,G if G ∈ Gt.( i i )s t a t e s
that at time t in event G only “continuation acts” matter for choice.
Axiom 2 (Variational preferences–VP) For each (t,ω) ∈ T× Ω:
(i) %t,ω is complete and transitive.
(ii) For all h,h0 ∈ H and y,y0 ∈ XT ,a n df o ra l lα ∈ (0,1),i fαh+( 1−α)y %t,ω αh0 +(1−α)y
then αh +( 1− α)y0 %t,ω αh0 +( 1− α)y0.
(iii) For all h,h0,h 00 ∈ H,t h es e t s{α ∈ [0,1] : αh +( 1− α)h0 %t,ω h00} and {α ∈ [0,1] : h00 %t,ω
αh +( 1− α)h0} are closed.
5Notice that for all ω ∈ Ω with p(Gt (ω)) 6=0 , p(·|G t )(ω)=pGt(ω),a sd e ﬁned by (6).
8(iv) For all h,h0 ∈ H,i f(h0 (ω0),h 1 (ω0),...,hT (ω0)) %t,ω (h0
0 (ω0),h 0
1 (ω0),...,h0
T (ω0)) for all
ω0 ∈ Ω,t h e nh %t,ω h0.
(v) For all h,h0 ∈ H,i fh ∼t,ω h0,t h e nαh +( 1− α)h0 %t,ω h for all α ∈ (0,1).
(vi) There exist x Ât,ω x0 in X such that for all α ∈ (0,1) there is x00 ∈ X satisfying either
x0 Ât,ω αx00 +( 1− α)x or αx00 +( 1− α)x0 Ât,ω x.
The requirement here is that at every time-state node the agent has (unbounded) variational
preferences; see Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini [21] for a discussion of (i)-(vi).






holds for some (t,ω) ∈ T× Ω and some τ ≥ t, then it holds for all (t,ω) ∈ T× Ω and all τ ≥ t.6
This is a standard stationarity axiom.
Axiom 4 (Dynamic consistency–DC) For each (t,ω) ∈ T× Ω with t<T,a n da l lh,h0 ∈ H,
if hτ = h0
τ for all τ ≤ t and h %t+1,ω0 h0 for all ω0 ∈ Ω,t h e nh %t,ω h0.
As Epstein and Schneider [6, p. 6] observe “According to the hypothesis, h and h0 are identical
for times up to t, while h is ranked (weakly) better in every state at t +1 . ‘Therefore’, it should
be ranked better also at (t,ω). A stronger and more customary version of the axiom would require
t h es a m ec o n c l u s i o ng i v e nt h ew e a k e rh y p o t h e s i st h a t
ht (ω)=h0
t (ω) and h %t+1,ω0 h0 for all ω0 ∈ Gt (ω).
In fact, given CP, the two versions are equivalent.” Again, we refer to [6] for a discussion of
dynamic consistency, which might be sometimes controversial in the presence of ambiguity.7
As t a t eω00 ∈ Ω is %t,ω-null if
h(τ0,ω0)=h0 (τ0,ω0) for all τ0 ∈ T and all ω0 6= ω00 implies h ∼t,ω h0.
Axiom 5 (Full support–FS) No state in Ω is %0,Ω-null.
4 The Representation
We ﬁrst extend to the current dynamic setting the notion of ambiguity index c we used in the static
setting of [21]. A dynamic ambiguity index is a family {ct}t∈T of functions ct : Ω×∆(Ω) → [0,∞]
such that for all t ∈ T :
(i) ct (·,p):Ω → [0,∞] is Gt-measurable for all p ∈ ∆(Ω),8
(ii) ct (ω,·):∆(Ω) → [0,∞] is grounded,9 closed and convex, with domct (ω,·) ⊆ ∆(Gt (ω))




≡ (y0,...,yτ−1,x,x 0,y τ+2,...,yT) if τ<Tand (y0,...,yT−1,x) otherwise.
7Inspection of our proofs shows that the weaker version of DC in which % is replaced by ∼ is enough to obtain
the results of the following section.
8Equivalently, ct (ω,·)=ct (ω0,·) for all ω,ω0 ∈ Ω such that Gt (ω)=Gt (ω0).
9That is, minp∈∆(Ω) ct (ω,p)=0 .
9Observe that the eﬀective domains of the ct (ω,·) consist of predictive distributions, that is, of
the conditional probabilities on the nodes Gt (ω). In the terminology more used in the MP model,
we would call them the Bayesian updates of the original priors p ∈ ∆(Ω).
In our ﬁrst result we characterize a dynamic version of variational preferences that do not
necessarily satisfy dynamic consistency. Notice that in (9) we consider ∆++ (Ω) in order to have
well deﬁned conditional probabilities pGt(ω).
Proposition 1 The following statements are equivalent:
(a) {%t,ω} satisfy CP, VP, RP, and for each (t,ω) ∈ T× Ω no state in Gt (ω) is %t,ω-null.
(b) There exist a scalar β>0,a nu n b o u n d e da ﬃne function u : X → R,a n dad y n a m i c
ambiguity index {ct} such that, for each (t,ω) ∈ T× Ω, %t,ω is represented by











 ∀h ∈ H. (9)
Moreover, (β0,u 0,{c0
t}) represents {%t,ω} in the sense of (9) if and only if β0 = β, u0 = au + b
for some a>0 and b ∈ R,a n d{c0
t} = {act}.
As a result, for all t ∈ T and all h ∈ H, the preference functional Vt (·,h) is a Gt-measurable
random variable










 + ct (p|Gt)

.
We call dynamic variational preferences the (families of) preferences satisfying CP, VP, RP, and
such that no state in Gt (ω) is %t,ω-null. It is natural to wonder what restriction on the dynamic
ambiguity index would characterize the dynamic variational preferences that satisfy dynamic con-
sistency. This condition, which we have called the “no-gain condition” in the Introduction, is given
in the next theorem, which is the main result of the paper.
Theorem 1 The following statements are equivalent:
(a) {%t,ω} satisfy CP, VP, RP, FS, and DC.
(b) There exist a scalar β>0,a nu n b o u n d e da ﬃne function u : X → R,a n dad y n a m i c
ambiguity index {ct} such that, for each (t,ω) ∈ T× Ω, %t,ω is represented by

















q(G)ct+1(G,qG)+ m i n
{p∈∆(Gt(ω)):p|Gt+1=q|Gt+1}
ct(ω,p), (11)
for all q ∈ ∆(Gt (ω)) and all t<T.
Moreover, (β0,u 0,{c0
t}) represents {%t,ω} in the sense of (10) if and only if β0 = β, u0 = au+b
for some a>0 and b ∈ R,a n d{c0
t} = {act}.
10Therefore, dynamic variational preferences satisfy dynamic consistency if and only if their
dynamic ambiguity index has the recursive structure (11), that is, if and only if the no-gain
condition is satisﬁed and updating is done according to Bayes’ Rule.
In turn, (11) delivers the recursive representation





Vt+1 (h)dr + γt (ω,r)
¶
(12)
of the agent’s preference functional Vt,w h e r e
γt (ω,r)= m i n
{p∈∆(Gt(ω)):p|Gt+1=r}
ct(ω,p) ∀r ∈ ∆(Ω,Gt+1), (13)
(see Lemma 6 in the Appendix).
In view of all this, we call recursive variational preferences the dynamic variational preferences
satisfying dynamic consistency, and we call recursive ambiguity indexes their dynamic ambiguity
indexes, that is, the dynamic indexes satisfying the no-gain condition (11) for some β>0.
Recall from the Introduction that the recursive formula (11) has a transparent interpretation
under the game against Nature interpretation of our setting, in which {ct} is a dynamic cost for
Nature. In fact, (11) suggests that the cost for Nature of choosing q at time t in state ω can
be decomposed as the sum of: the discounted expected cost of choosing q’s conditionals at time




of inducing q|Gt+1 as one-period-ahead marginal. By (11) and
(12), both Nature’s costs and agent’s preferences are recursive.
As (12) shows, in our recursive representation the evolution of ambiguity aversion is determined
by how the functions γt (ω,·) depend on t and ω. This will emerge clearly in the next Subsection.
Here we observe that in applications some special speciﬁcation of such dependence can be useful.
For example, in the standard setup Ω = ZT d i s c u s s e di nS e c t i o n2 . 1w ec a na s s u m eaM a r k o v -
ian structure, where γt (ω) depends on ω only through the last observation, or an independent
structure, where γt (ω) does not depend on t and ω (see Example 6 below).
Behaviorally, these dependence structures can be characterized by suitable stationarity require-
ments on the preferences %t,ω.
Finally, after the completion of an earlier version of this paper, we learned of independent work
by Detlefsen and Scandolo [1], who arrive at a condition related to (11) in studying conditions for
the time consistency of risk measures.
4.1 Going Backward
A main advantage of the recursive structure of the no-gain condition (11) is that it permits the
construction by backward induction of recursive ambiguity indexes, and so of recursive variational
preferences via (12) and (13).
The next result provides the key ingredient for the desired backward induction construction
Proposition 2 Let {ct} be a dynamic ambiguity index. For all t<T and ω ∈ Ω,s e t 11
γt (ω,r) ≡ min
{p∈∆(Gt(ω)):p|Gt+1=r}
ct(ω,p) ∀r ∈ ∆(Ω,Gt+1).







ct+1 (q |Gt+1 )dq.
11Here we adopt the convention that the minimum over the empty set is ∞.
11(i) γt (·,r):Ω → [0,∞] is Gt-measurable for all r ∈ ∆(Ω,Gt+1).
(ii) γt (ω,·):∆(Ω,Gt+1) → [0,∞] is grounded, closed and convex, with domγt (ω,·) ⊆ ∆(Gt (ω),Gt+1)
and domγt (ω,·) ∩ ∆++ (Gt (ω),Gt+1) 6= ∅,f o ra l lω ∈ Ω.
The index γt (ω,r) can be interpreted as the cost for Nature of inducing r as one-period-ahead
marginal, as suggested by (12) and (13). Since the properties of γt (ω,·) on ∆(Ω,Gt+1) are analo-
gous to those of a static (or dynamic) ambiguity index on the set of the agent’s subjective beliefs,
we call one-period-ahead ambiguity index a family {γt}t<T of functions that satisﬁes conditions (i)
and (ii) of Proposition 2.
Next we characterize recursive ambiguity indexes by means of one-period-ahead ones, thus
giving the desired backward induction construction of recursive ambiguity indexes. Here δC is the
indicator function deﬁned in (3) and, given ω ∈ Ω, dω is the Dirac probability assigning mass 1 to
ω.
Theorem 2 Let {ct}t∈T be a family of functions from Ω × ∆(Ω) to [0,∞]. The following state-
ments are equivalent:
(a) {ct} is a recursive ambiguity index.
(b) There exist β>0 and a one-period-ahead ambiguity index {γt} such that, for all ω ∈ Ω,













∀q ∈ ∆(Gt (ω))
∞∀ q ∈ ∆(Ω)\∆(Gt (ω)).
In this case, {γt} is unique and satisﬁes (13).
The important implication is (b) ⇒ (a), which allows to construct any recursive ambiguity index
by backward induction: it suﬃces to specify at any non-terminal node G = Gt (ω) a grounded,
closed and convex function γG on the set of all probabilities on the branches springing from G.
This decomposition of cost functions in one-period-ahead components is a key feature of our
derivation. The next example illustrates this feature by showing what happens in a binomial tree if
we take at each non-terminal node the relative Gini concentration index χ2 (pkq),d e ﬁn e di n( 1 9 ) ,
as one-period-ahead ambiguity index.
Example 6 Consider Example 1 with T =2 ,t h a ti s ,Ω = {0,1}
2.W eh a v e :
G1 = {{0},{1}} and G2 = {{0,0},{0,1},{1,0},{1,1}},
where {0} = {(0,0),(0,1)} and {1} = {(1,0),(1,1)}. Hence,
∆(Ω,G1)={(r,1 − r):r ∈ [0,1]},
∆({0},G2)=∆({0})={(r,1 − r):r ∈ [0,1]},
∆({1},G2)=∆({1})={(r,1 − r):r ∈ [0,1]},
and ∆(Ω,G2)=∆(Ω).L e tq ∈ ∆(Ω) be the uniform distribution with q (ω)=1 /4 for all ω ∈ Ω,
and set ϕ(π) ≡ 2π2 +2( 1− π)
2 − 1 for each π ∈ [0,1]. Deﬁne
γ0 (Ω,p) ≡ χ2 ¡
pkq|G1
¢
= ϕ(p(0)) ∀p ∈ ∆(Ω,G1),





ϕ(p(0,0)) if p ∈ ∆({0}),
∞ otherwise,
12and





ϕ(p(1,0)) if p ∈ ∆({1}),
∞ otherwise,
By Theorem 2, using these one-period-ahead ambiguity indexes we can construct a recursive dy-






























+ ϕ(p00 + p01),
w h e r ew es e tpij = p(i,j)for i,j ∈ {0,1} a n dw ea d o p tt h ec o n v e n t i o n0ϕ(0/0) = 0. N
5S p e c i a l C a s e s
5.1 Multiple Prior Preferences
We now show that Epstein and Schneider [6]’s characterization of dynamic MP preferences is
a special case of ours, modulo some minor diﬀerences (they do not assume unboundedness and
assume a slightly stronger version of dynamic consistency).
MP preferences are the special class of variational preferences satisfying the certainty indepen-
dence condition of Gilboa and Schmeidler [9]. In the present dynamic setting, this amounts to
consider:
MP(ii) For all h,h0 ∈ H, y ∈ XT ,a n dα ∈ (0,1), h %t,ω h0 if and only if αh +( 1− α)y %t,ω
αh0 +( 1− α)y,
which is a stronger version of VP(ii) (in [21] we discuss the diﬀerent behavioral implications of
these two axioms).
Under the stronger MP(ii), the ambiguity index ct (ω) becomes an indicator function, and
the no-gain condition (11) coincides with rectangularity, which is the condition that [6] used to
characterize recursive MP preferences.
Corollary 1 Let {%t,ω} be a family of dynamic variational preferences. The following statements
are equivalent:
(a) {%t,ω} satisfy MP(ii).
(b) For every t and ω, there exists a closed and convex subset Ct (ω) of ∆(Ω) such that ct (ω)=
δCt(ω).












for all ω ∈ Ω and t<T,w h e r eCt+1 (G)=Ct+1 (ω0) for all ω0 ∈ G,a n dCt (ω)|Gt+1 is the set of
restrictions to the algebra generated by Gt+1 of the probabilities in Ct (ω).
135.2 Multiplier Preferences









if p ¿ q,
∞ otherwise,
with the convention 0ln(0/a)=0for all a ≥ 0. Analogously, if p,q ∈ ∆(Ω,G),w h e r eG is a









if p ¿ q,
∞ otherwise,
again with the convention 0ln(0/a)=0for all a ≥ 0.
Given a reference probabilistic model q ∈ ∆++ (Ω),w ec a l ldynamic multiplier preferences the
family of preferences on H represented for every t and ω by











 ∀h ∈ H. (15)
The name is inspired by the robust control approach of Hansen and Sargent [11].12 They
interpret θ as a coeﬃcient of uncertainty aversion, an interpretation we formalize and discuss in


















a very convenient expression in calculations.
Next we show that dynamic multiplier preferences are recursive variational preferences and






for all t ∈ T , ω ∈ Ω,a n dp ∈ ∆(Ω).
Theorem 3 For all q ∈ ∆++ (Ω), β>0, unbounded aﬃne u : X → R,a n dθ>0, the dynamic
multiplier preferences represented by (15) are recursive variational preferences with ambiguity index
given by (17). In particular,














for each h ∈ H, ω ∈ Ω,a n dt<T.
The recursive formulation (18) is especially important because it makes it possible to use stan-
dard dynamic programming tools in studying optimization problems involving dynamic multiplier
preferences. This class of dynamic variational preferences is therefore very tractable, something
important for applications.
The recursive nature of multiplier preferences was already observed by Hansen and Sargent
(see [11, p. 64]).13 The contribution of Theorem 3 is to show that this is a very special case of the
general recursive representation given in Theorems 1 and 2. As a result, Theorem 3 provides the
proper theoretical underpinning for this crucial property of multiplier preferences.
12Clearly, the functionals βtVt (ω,h)=i n f p∈∆++(Ω)
U S






13Skiadas [29] studies the recursive structure of a continuous time version of a robust control preference functional.
145.3 Mean-Variance Preferences
We conclude by observing that Theorem 3 does not hold when we replace the relative entropy with a











− 1 if p ¿ q,
∞ otherwise.
(19)
In [21] and [23] we show that
θ
2
χ2 (pkq) is the ambiguity index associated with the classic mean-














where q ∈ ∆++ (Ω) is again a reference probability.







is not recursive, and so the dynamic variational preferences represented by














are not dynamically consistent.
It is possible, however, to construct a dynamically consistent version of (monotone) mean-
variance preferences along the lines of Example 6 by using the relative Gini concentration index as
a one-period-ahead ambiguity index.
6D i ﬀerential Properties
Optimization problems are pervasive in economic applications and the diﬀerential properties of the
involved preference functionals play a key role in their resolution. For this reason we now study the
diﬀerential properties of our recursive variational preference functionals, and we show that their
analytical tractability is adequate for applications.
This extends to the dynamic setting of this paper what we established in [21], where we showed
that in the static case variational preference functionals have nice diﬀerentiability properties.
In this section we set X = ∆(R).L e tF be the subset of H consisting of monetary (i.e., real
valued) acts.14 Throughout this section we consider a recursive variational preference functional
Vt (ω,·):H → R, as given by Theorem 1. We make the standard assumption that the associated
utility function u : X → R is concave (thus reﬂecting risk aversion) and strictly increasing on R.
Like Epstein and Wang [7], for ω ∈ Ω, t<T,a n df ∈ F,w ec a l lone-period-ahead directional
derivative of Vt (ω,·) at f the functional V 0
t (ω,f;·):Et → R deﬁned by
V 0
t (ω,f;e) ≡ lim
λ↓0
Vt (ω,f + λe) − Vt (ω,f)
λ
∀e ∈ Et,
where Et i st h es u b s p a c eo fF consisting of all processes e such that eτ =0if τ 6= t,t +1 .T h e s e
processes represent current and one-period-ahead consumption perturbations.
The functional Vt (ω,·) is (one-period-ahead Gateaux) diﬀerentiable at f if V 0
t (ω,f;·) is linear
on Et.I nt h i sc a s e ,V 0
t (ω,f;·) is the (Gateaux) diﬀerential of Vt (ω,·) at f.
14Under the usual identiﬁcation of z ∈ R with dz ∈ X.
15Theorem 4 Let ω ∈ Ω and t<T .T h e n , Vt (ω,·) is diﬀerentiable on F if and only if u is
diﬀerentiable on R and γt (ω,·) is essentially strictly convex.15 In particular,
V 0
t (ω,f;e)=u0 (ft (ω))et (ω)+β
Z
et+1u0 (ft+1)dρ ∀f ∈ F,e∈ Et, (20)




Vt+1 (f)dr + γt (ω,r)
¢
.
This result provides a full characterization of diﬀerentiability for the recursive variational prefer-
ence functional Vt (ω,·), and it provides an explicit formula for evaluating the diﬀerential V 0
t (ω,f;·).
We proved a static version of this result (as well as of Theorem 5) in [21], and it is important that
Observe that the strict convexity of γt (ω,·) holds for all divergence preferences, a large class of
variational preferences we introduced in [21] and that includes multiplier preferences. For example,
by Theorem 3 (and by some well known properties of the relative entropy, see [4, p. 34]), formula
(20) takes the following neat form for dynamic multiplier preferences :
V 0

















for each f ∈ F and e ∈ Et.
As Vt (ω,·) is concave, the powerful theory of superdiﬀerentials can be used when Vt (ω,·) is not
diﬀerentiable. Besides its intrinsic interest, this is also important conceptually as points of non-
diﬀerentiability, the so-called “kinks,” play an important role in some applications of the multiple
priors model and of the closely related Choquet expected utility model (see [3], [7], and [24]).
Denote by M(Gt (ω),Gt+1) the set of all measures on A(Gt+1) that vanish on each subset of
Gt (ω)
c.Aone-period-ahead supergradient of Vt (ω) at f is an element (k,m) of R × M(Gt (ω),Gt+1)
such that
V 0
t (ω,f;e) ≤ ket (ω)+β
Z
et+1dm, ∀e ∈ Et.
The superdiﬀerential ∂Vt (ω,f) of Vt (ω,·) at f is the set of all one-period-ahead supergradients at
f.T h es u p e r d i ﬀerential ∂Vt (ω,f) is a singleton if and only if Vt (ω,·) is diﬀerentiable at f;i nt h i s
case, ∂Vt (ω,f)={V 0
t (ω,f;·)}.
The following result is the superdiﬀerential version of Theorem 4.
Theorem 5 For all ω ∈ Ω, t<T,a n df ∈ F, ∂Vt (ω,f) consists of all pairs
(u0 (ft (ω)),u 0 (ft+1)dρ) (21)





Vt+1 (f)dr + γt (ω,r)
¢
.16
Eq. (21) provides an explicit formula for the superdiﬀential ∂Vt (ω,f), which is equivalent to
(20) when ∂Vt (ω,f) is a singleton, that is, when Vt (ω,·) is diﬀerentiable at f.
Theorem 5 generalizes Epstein and Wang [7, Lemma 1], and we expect that this result can be
used to extend their asset pricing analysis to recursive variational preferences.
Summing up, Theorems 4 and 5 show that dynamic variational preference functionals have nice
diﬀerentiability properties, something we already established in and this extends
15For a formal deﬁnition of essential strict convexity see [26, p. 253]. Needless to say, a strictly convex functional
is a fortiori essentially strictly convex.
16Here ∂u(z) is the superdiﬀential of u at z, while u0 (ft+1)dρ is the measure with density u0 (ft+1) with respect
to ρ.
167C o n c l u s i o n s
Ambiguity adverse behavior is pervasive, and the theory of ambiguity aversion has found applica-
tions in macroeconomics, ﬁnance, even political analysis.
A widely accepted theory has been so far the theory of multiple priors of [9]. Diﬀerent ap-
proaches, mostly found under the name of robust preferences, have made desirable an extension
of this theory to include a larger class of behaviors. The extension, in the static case, has been
provided by the theory of variational preferences introduced by [21]. This is, however, a theory
of static choice, while most of the applications we have mentioned are in dynamic environments:
hence, a further extension to the intertemporal problem is desirable. This paper provides such a
theory.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. The ﬁrst, Proposition 1, characterizes the
intertemporal preferences that have a variational representation, the so-called dynamic variational
preferences (intuitively, variational decision makers can be viewed as making their choices “as if”
they think they are facing a malevolent opponent, which we call Nature).
The second result, Theorem 1, characterizes the dynamic preferences that are time consistent.
In particular, a variational decision maker is dynamically consistent if and only if he thinks that
Nature is also dynamically consistent.
The third result, Theorem 2, provides a decomposition of the cost function into one step ahead
costs, paid by Nature in every period. This decomposition makes it possible to use recursive
analysis in studying the dynamic choice problem of a decision maker with variational preferences.
The fourth result, Theorem 3, is an application of Theorem 1 and it shows that the dynamic
consistency of the widely used multiplier preferences introduced by Hansen and Sargent is a con-
sequence of our general Theorems 1 and 2.
The ﬁnal results, Theorem 4 and 5, show that recursive variational preferences have nice diﬀer-
ential properties, something crucial for their use in the optimization problems that arise in most
economic applications.
We close by observing that, though in the paper we assumed both Ω and T ﬁnite, we expect that
the extension to the inﬁnite case can be carried out in standard ways. Moreover, even though in
our representation theorems we consider standard discounted utility, some results can be extended
to include hyperbolic discounting. For example, this can be done by weakening Axiom 3 along
the lines of Hayashi [14]. However, the motivation behind hyperbolic discounting is very diﬀerent
from model uncertainty and for this reason here we prefer to use standard discounting in order to
better focus the paper.
AP r o o f s a n d R e l a t e d M a t e r i a l
An important tool for the proofs is Convex Analysis, we refer the reader to [26] and [16] for
notation, deﬁnitions, and results.
Here we just remind that a function I : C → (−∞,∞],d e ﬁned on a non-empty subset C of RΩ,
is normalized if I (b1Ω)=b for all b ∈ R such that b1Ω ∈ C;17 it is a (ﬁnite) niveloid if I (C) ⊆ R
and I (ψ) − I (ϕ) ≤ supω∈Ω (ψ(ω) − ϕ(ω)) for all ψ,ϕ ∈ C;i ti sgrounded if infψ∈C I (ψ)=0 ,
it is proper if it is not identically ∞ and there is an aﬃne function minorizing it. Niveloids are
comprehensively studied in Dolecki and Greco [2] and Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini [22].
When R ∈ {R,R+,R++,R−,R−−} and C = RΩ, I is a niveloid if and only if I is monotonic
(I (ψ) ≥ I (ϕ) for all ψ,ϕ ∈ RΩ such that ψ ≥ ϕ)a n dvertically invariant (I (ψ + b)=I (ψ)+b
for all ψ ∈ RΩ and b ∈ R). We will use the following lemmas:
171Ω is the constant vector (1,1,...,1). Sometimes we will write b instead of b1Ω.
17Lemma 1 Let J : RΩ → R be concave, C ⊆ RΩ and I : C → [−∞,∞]. The following statements
are equivalent:
(a) J (ϕ)=i n f ψ∈C (hϕ,ψi + I (ψ)) for all ϕ ∈ RΩ;
(b) I : C → (−∞,∞] is proper and coI = −J∗.18
Lemma 2 Let C be a convex compact subset of RΩ,a n dI : C → (−∞,∞] ap r o p e rc l o s e da n d
convex function. Then infψ∈riC I (ψ)=m i n ψ∈C I (ψ) iﬀ riC∩domI 6= ∅ iﬀ infψ∈riC I (ψ) < ∞.19
Lemma 3 Let J : RΩ → R be a concave normalized niveloid, and G ⊆ Ω. The following statements
are equivalent:
(a) If ϕ,ψ ∈ RΩ are such that ϕ|G = ψ|G,t h e nJ (ϕ)=J (ψ);
(b) J (ϕ + ψ)=J (ϕ)+ψ(G) if ϕ,ψ ∈ RΩ and ψ is constant on G;
(c) J (ϕ1Gc)=0for all ϕ ∈ RΩ;20
(d) domJ∗ ⊆ ∆(G).
Next lemma is the ﬁrst important step towards the proof of Proposition 1.
Lemma 4 The following statements are equivalent:
(a) {%t,ω} satisfy CP, VP, and RP.
(b) There exists a family {ct (ω,·):( t,ω) ∈ T× Ω} of grounded, closed and convex functions
ct (ω,·):∆(Ω) → [0,∞],s u c ht h a tdomct (ω,·) ⊆ ∆(Gt (ω)) and ct (ω,·)=ct (ω0,·) if Gt (ω)=
Gt (ω0), β>0, and an unbounded aﬃne u : X → R such that: for every t and ω, %t,ω is represented
by Vt (ω,·),w h e r e






βτ−tu(hτ)dp + ct (ω,p)

 ∀h ∈ H. (22)
Moreover,
¡¯ β,¯ u,{¯ ct (ω,·)}
¢
represent %t,ω in the sense of (22) iﬀ ¯ β = β, ¯ u = au + b for some
a>0 and b ∈ R and {¯ ct (ω,·)} = {act (ω,·)}.
Finally, if |Gt (ω)| > 1, the following facts are equivalent:
(i) for all h ∈ H,






βτ−tu(hτ)dp + ct (ω,p)

; (23)
(ii) no state in Gt (ω) is %t,ω-null;
(iii) domct (ω,·) ∩ ri∆(Gt (ω)) 6= ∅.
Notice that (22) can be rewritten as






βτ−tu(hτ)dp + ct (ω,p)

 ∀h ∈ H. (24)
Moreover, if |Gt (ω)| =1 , Gt (ω) is a singleton {ω}, ∆(Gt (ω)) = ri∆(Gt (ω)) and (iii) is auto-
matically satisﬁed, in this case both (22) and (23) collapse to Vt (ω,h)=
P
τ≥t βτ−tu(hτ (ω)).
For the rest of the paper, we indiﬀerently write ct (ω,·), ct (ω),o rct,ω,a n dVt (ω,·), Vt (ω) or
Vt,ω.
18coI denotes the closed and convex hull of I, J∗ the concave conjugate of J.
19riC denotes the relative interior of C, domI the eﬀective domain of I.
20For every A ⊆ Ω, 1A is the vector deﬁned by 1A (ω) ≡ 1 if ω ∈ A, 1A (ω) ≡ 0 if ω/ ∈ A.
18Proof. (a) ⇒ (b). A variation on the proof of Lemma A.1 of [6] (see also [30]) delivers the ﬁrst
two steps:
Step 1. There exist β>0 and an unbounded aﬃne u : X → R such that, for all (t,ω) ∈ T× Ω,
%t,ω on XT is represented by Ut (y) ≡
P
τ≥t βτ−tu(yτ) for all y ∈ XT .
Step 2. For all (t,ω) ∈ T× Ω,a n da l lh ∈ H there exists y = y(t,ω,h) ∈ XT (indeed constant)
such that y ∼t,ω h.
Then it is easy to check that:
Step 3. For all (t,ω) ∈ T× Ω, the correspondence Vt,ω : H → R,d e ﬁned by Vt,ω (h) ≡ Ut (y) if
h ∼t,ω y ∈ XT ,i saw e l ld e ﬁned function that represents %t,ω on H.
Each h ∈ H can be regarded as a function h : Ω → XT ,a n dUt : XT → R is an aﬃne
function for every t ∈ T .S e t Ut (h) ≡ Ut ◦ h.B y d e ﬁnition, Ut (h):Ω → R and Ut (h)(ω0) ≡
Ut (h(ω0)) =
P
τ≥t βτ−tu(hτ (ω0)) for all ω0 ∈ Ω. In particular, if y (τ,ω0)=yτ for all τ ∈ T
and all ω0 ∈ Ω,t h e nUt (y)(ω0)=
P
τ≥t βτ−tu(yτ)=Ut (y0,...,yT) for all ω0 ∈ Ω.21 Moreover,
Ut (αh +( 1− α)h0)=αUt (h)+( 1− α)Ut (h0) for all h,h0 ∈ H and α ∈ [0,1].U pt oac a r d i n a l
transformation of u, we can assume u(X) ∈ {R,R+,R++,R−,R−−}. For the rest of the proof the
case u(X)=R++ is considered (the arguments we use can be easily adapted to the remaining
ones).
Step 4. For all t ∈ T , {Ut (h):h ∈ H} = u(X)
Ω.
Proof. The inclusion ⊆ is trivial. If t<Tand ψ ∈ u(X)
Ω,t h e r ee x i s t sε>0 such that
ψ−ε ∈ u(X)




ε. For all ω0 ∈ Ω,t h e r ee x i s t s
x










ψ(ω0) if τ = T.
This delivers, Ut (h(ω0)) =
P












+ ψ(ω0) − ε = ψ(ω0) for all ω0 ∈ Ω;a sw a n t e d . I ft = T,s e tε =0
and choose xε arbitrarily. ¤
Step 5. For all (t,ω) ∈ T× Ω, the correspondence It,ω : u(X)
Ω → R,d e ﬁned by It,ω (ψ) ≡ Vt,ω (h)
if ψ = Ut (h) for some h ∈ H,i saw e l ld e ﬁned, monotonic, and normalized function.
Proof. If h and h0 in H are such that ψ = Ut (h)=Ut (h0), for all ω0 ∈ Ω we have
P
τ≥t βτ−tu(hτ (ω0)) =
P
τ≥t βτ−tu(h0
τ (ω0)) and h(ω0) ∼t,ω h0 (ω0).B y V P ( i v ) , h ∼t,ω h0 and Vt,ω (h)=Vt,ω (h0).
This implies that It,ω is a well deﬁned function since for every ψ ∈ u(X)
Ω there is h ∈ H
such that ψ = Ut (h). Monotonicity is proved along the same lines. As to normalization, if
















= b for all ω0 ∈ Ω,t h e nb1Ω = Ut
¡
xb¢
(where xb is regarded as a







Step 6. Let (t,ω) ∈ T× Ω.F o re v e r yψ ∈ u(X)
Ω and for every b ∈ R such that ψ + b ∈ u(X)
Ω,
It,ω (ψ + b)=It,ω (ψ)+b.
Proof. Let ψ0 = Ut (h0),ψ00 = Ut (h00) ∈ u(X)
Ω, b0 = Ut (x0),b 00 = Ut (x00) ∈ u(X), VP(ii) guaran-
tees that for all α ∈ (0,1), αh0 +(1−α)x0 ∼t,ω αh00 +(1−α)x0 implies αh0 +(1−α)x00 ∼t,ω αh00 +
21The identiﬁcation between acts with consequences depending only on time (and not on state) and elements of
XT corresponds here to the equivalence between constant functions on Ω and real numbers.
19(1 − α)x00, i.e. Vt,ω (αh0 +( 1− α)x0)=Vt,ω (αh00 +( 1− α)x0) implies Vt,ω (αh0 +( 1− α)x00)=
Vt,ω (αh00 +( 1− α)x00), hence It,ω (Ut (αh0 +( 1− α)x0)) = It,ω (Ut (αh00 +( 1− α)x0)) implies that
It,ω (Ut (αh0 +( 1− α)x00)) = It,ω (Ut (αh00 +( 1− α)x00)),a n d ,ﬁnally, It,ω (αψ0 +( 1− α)b0)=
It,ω (αψ00 +( 1− α)b0) implies It,ω (αψ0 +( 1− α)b00)=It,ω (αψ00 +( 1− α)b00). Replacing ψ0 with
ψ0/α ∈ u(X)
Ω, ψ00 with ψ00/α ∈ u(X)
Ω, b0 with b0/(1 − α) ∈ u(X), b00 with b0/(1 − α) ∈ u(X),
it follows that
It,ω (ψ0 + b0)=It,ω (ψ00 + b0) implies It,ω (ψ0 + b00)=It,ω (ψ00 + b00) (25)
for all ψ0,ψ00 ∈ u(X)
Ω, b0,b 00 ∈ u(X).L e t ψ ∈ u(X)
Ω,t h e nminω0 ψ(ω0) ∈ u(X),b u tIt,ω
is monotonic and normalized, thus It,ω (ψ) ≥ It,ω (minω0 ψ(ω0)) = minω0 ψ(ω0) ∈ u(X),a n d
hence It,ω (ψ) ∈ u(X).L e t b>0,t h e r ei sε>0 such that ψ − ε ∈ u(X)
Ω and It,ω (ψ) − ε ∈
u(X). By normalization and (25) It,ω ((ψ − ε)+ε)=It,ω (ψ)=It,ω ((It,ω (ψ) − ε)+ε) implies
It,ω (ψ + b)=It,ω ((ψ − ε)+( ε + b)) = It,ω ((It,ω (ψ) − ε)+( ε + b)) = It,ω (ψ)+b.I fb<0,t h e n
It,ω (ψ)=It,ω ((ψ + b) − b)=It,ω (ψ + b) − b,a sw a n t e d . ¤
Moreover, from VP(v), it immediately follows that:
Step 7. Let (t,ω) ∈ T× Ω. For every ψ,ψ0 ∈ u(X)
Ω such that It,ω (ψ)=It,ω (ψ0),a n de v e r y
α ∈ (0,1), It,ω (αψ +( 1− α)ψ0) ≥ It,ω (ψ).
Steps 5—7 and the results we prove in [22] imply that: For all (t,ω) ∈ T× Ω, It,ω is a
concave and normalized niveloid on u(X)
Ω. The restriction of its concave conjugate to ∆(Ω),
I∗
t,ω (p) ≡ infψ∈u(X)Ω (hψ,pi − It,ω (ψ)) for all p ∈ ∆(Ω), is the unique concave and upper semicon-
tinuous function I
#






for all ψ ∈ u(X)
Ω.
Moreover, the correspondence Jt,ω : RΩ → R,d e ﬁned by Jt,ω (ϕ) ≡ It,ω (ϕ + b) − b if ϕ ∈ RΩ
and b ∈ R is such that ϕ + b ∈ u(X)
Ω, is a normalized concave niveloid and its concave
conjugate J∗
t,ω coincides with I∗
t,ω on ∆(Ω) and takes value −∞ on RΩ\∆(Ω).22 In particu-





for all ϕ ∈ RΩ. (See [22] for details.) By CP(i), if
Gt (ω)=Gt (ω0),w ec a nc h o o s eIt,ω = It,ω0 and set ct,ω (p) ≡− I∗
t,ω (p)=−J∗
t,ω (p) for all
p ∈ ∆(Ω) and all (t,ω) ∈ T× Ω.T h e nct,ω : ∆(Ω) → [0,∞] is grounded, closed, and convex for
all (t,ω) ∈ T× Ω; ct,ω0 = ct,ω if Gt (ω)=Gt (ω0); for all (t,ω) ∈ T× Ω, %t,ω is represented by
Vt,ω (h)=It,ω (Ut (h)) = Jt,ω (Ut (h)) = minp∈∆(Ω)
¡
hUt (h),pi − I∗
t,ω (p)
¢
,t h a ti s









βτ−tu(hτ (ω0)) + ct (ω,p)

.
Step 8. Let (t,ω) ∈ T× Ω.I fϕ1,ϕ 2 ∈ RΩ and ϕ1
|Gt(ω) = ϕ2







Proof. It suﬃces to show that: if ψ1,ψ2 ∈ u(X)
Ω and ψ1
|Gt(ω) = ψ2












ψi(ω0) if τ = T
like in Step 4, with the precaution of choosing x
ψ1(ω0) = x
ψ2(ω0) if ω0 ∈ Gt (ω) ( t h i si sp o s s i b l e
since ψ1 (ω0)=ψ2 (ω0)). By construction, h1 (τ,ω0)=h2 (τ,ω0) for all τ ≥ t and ω0 ∈ Gt (ω).



















By Lemma 3, domct,ω =d o m J∗
t,ω ⊆ ∆(Gt (ω)). This concludes the proof of (a) ⇒ (b).
(b) ⇒ (a) and the uniqueness properties of (β,u,{ct (ω,·)}) can be easily checked (though the
veriﬁcation is a bit long).
22Jt,ω is the unique vertically invariant function that extends It,ω to RΩ.
20Step 9. Let (t,ω) ∈ T× Ω be such that |Gt (ω)| > 1.As t a t eω00 ∈ Gt (ω) is %t,ω-null if and only
if domct,ω ⊆ ∆(Gt (ω)\{ω00}).






for every ψ1,ψ2 ∈ RΩ
such that ψ1
|Gt(ω)\{ω00} = ψ2
|Gt(ω)\{ω00}. By Lemma 3, domct,ω =d o m J∗
t,ω ⊆ ∆(Gt (ω)\{ω00}).
Again, it is suﬃc i e n tt os h o wi tf o rψ1,ψ2 ∈ u(X)





ψi(ω0) if τ = T






ψi(ω0) if τ = T and ω0 6= ω00
xε if τ = T and ω0 = ω00
where xε and x
ψi(ω0) are deﬁned like in Step 4, with the precaution of choosing x
ψ1(ω0) = x
ψ2(ω0)
if ω0 ∈ Gt (ω)\{ω00} (this is possible since ψ1 (ω0)=ψ2 (ω0)). Since g1 (τ,ω0)=g2 (τ,ω0) for all
τ ≥ t and ω0 ∈ Gt (ω), CP(ii) implies g1 ∼t,ω g2, while %t,ω-nullity of ω00 implies hi ∼t,ω gi for


















T h ec o n v e r s ei se a s i l yc h e c k e d . ¤
Therefore, if a state ω00 in Gt (ω) is %t,ω-null, then domct,ω ⊆ ∆(Gt (ω)\{ω00}),a n dVt (ω,h) 6=
∞ =i n f p∈ri∆(Gt(ω))
³R P
τ≥t βτ−tu(hτ)dp + ct,ω (p)
´
for some (indeed all) h ∈ H.T h a ti s( i )⇒
(ii). Conversely, if Vt (ω,h) 6=i n f p∈ri ∆(Gt(ω))
³R P
τ≥t βτ−tu(hτ)dp + ct,ω (p)
´
for some h ∈ H,
then, by Lemma 2, ri∆(Gt (ω)) ∩ domct,ω = ∅. If, per contra, domct,ω is not contained in
∆(Gt (ω)\{ω00}) for some ω00 ∈ Gt (ω), then for all ω0 ∈ Gt (ω) there exists pω0
∈ domct,ω with
ω0 ∈ supppω0
,t h e n|Gt (ω)|
−1 P
ω0∈Gt(ω) pω0
∈ ri∆(Gt (ω)) ∩ domct,ω, which is absurd. Then
domct,ω ⊆ ∆(Gt (ω)\{ω00}) for some ω00,w h i c hm u s tb e%t,ω-null. This is (ii) ⇒ (i). The
equivalence between (i) and (iii) descends immediately from Lemma 2. ¥
Lemma 5 If {%t,ω} satisfy CP, FS, and DC, then for each t and ω, no state in Gt (ω) is %t,ω-null
provided |Gt (ω)| > 1.
Proof. Assume, per contra,t h a tt h e r ee x i s tω◦ ∈ Ω and t◦ ∈ T such that |Gt◦ (ω◦)| > 1 and
Gt◦ (ω◦) contains a %t◦,ω◦-null state. W.l.o.g., ω◦ is %t◦,ω◦-null. By FS, t◦ > 0 and
h(τ0,ω0)=h0 (τ0,ω0) for all τ0 ∈ T and all ω0 6= ω◦ implies h ∼t◦,ω◦ h0. (26)
Clearly, |Gt◦−1 (ω◦)| ≥ |Gt◦ (ω◦)| > 1. Next we show that ω◦ is %t◦−1,ω◦-null. In a ﬁnite number
of steps this leads to an absurd.
Assume that h(τ0,ω0)=h0 (τ0,ω0) for all τ0 ∈ T and all ω0 6= ω◦. By (26) and CP(i), h ∼t◦,ω h0
for all ω ∈ Gt◦ (ω◦).M o r e o v e r , i f ω ∈ Gt◦−1 (ω◦)\Gt◦ (ω◦),t h e nGt◦ (ω) does not contain ω◦,
and h(τ0,ω0)=h0 (τ0,ω0) for all τ0 ∈ T and all ω0 ∈ Gt◦ (ω). By CP(ii), h ∼t◦,ω h0 for all
ω ∈ Gt◦−1 (ω◦)\Gt◦ (ω◦). Therefore, h ∼t◦,ω h0 for all ω ∈ Gt◦−1 (ω◦).S i n c e|Gt◦−1 (ω◦)| > 1 and
ht◦−1 is Gt◦−1 measurable, choose ω00 ∈ Gt◦−1 (ω◦)−{ω◦} to obtain h(t◦ − 1,ω◦)=h(t◦ − 1,ω00)=
h0 (t◦ − 1,ω00)=h0 (t◦ − 1,ω◦) and conclude h(t◦ − 1,ω◦)=h0 (t◦ − 1,ω◦) and h ∼t◦,ω h0 for all
ω ∈ Gt◦−1 (ω◦), DC implies that h ∼t◦−1,ω◦ h0.T h a ti sω◦ is %t◦−1,ω◦-null. As wanted. ¥
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Axiom 6 (Strong full support–SFS) For each (t,ω) ∈ T× Ω, no state in Gt (ω) is %t,ω-null.
For technical reasons we prove a slightly more general version of Proposition 1.
21Proposition 3 The following statements are equivalent:
(a) {%t,ω} satisfy CP, VP, RP, and no state in Gt (ω) is %t,ω-null if Gt (ω) is not a singleton.
(b) There exist a scalar β>0,a nu n b o u n d e da ﬃne function u : X → R,a n dad y n a m i c
ambiguity index {ct},s u c ht h a t :f o re a c h(t,ω) ∈ T× Ω, %t,ω is represented by the functional
Vt (ω,·) deﬁned by (23).
(c) {%t,ω} satisfy CP, VP, RP, and SFS.
Moreover,
¡¯ β,¯ u,{¯ ct}
¢
represent %t,ω in the sense of (b) iﬀ ¯ β = β, ¯ u = au + b for some a>0
and b ∈ R and {¯ ct} = {act}.
Proof. (a) ⇔ (b) immediately descends from Lemma 4.
(c) ⇒ (a) is trivial.
(b) ⇒ (c). Since (b) ⇒ (a), if Gt (ω) is not a singleton, no state in Gt (ω) is %t,ω-null. Let
Gt (ω) be a singleton {ω}.T h e n ∆(Gt (ω)) = {dω},a n dVt (ω,h)=
P
τ≥t βτ−tu(hτ (ω)) for all






. Consider the acts
hi (τ,ω0) ≡
(
x1 if (τ,ω0) 6=( T,ω)
xi if (τ,ω0)=( T,ω)





















is not %t,ω-null. ¥
Since for every t and ω, ri∆(Gt (ω)) =
©
pGt(ω) : p ∈ ri∆(Ω)
ª
, (23) is equivalent to











 ∀h ∈ H. (27)
Consider the Gt measurable functions Vt (·,h):Ω → R and ct (·,p):Ω → [0,∞], (27) becomes












 ∀h ∈ H, (28)
or










 + ct (p|Gt)

 ∀h ∈ H. (29)
By Lemma 5, if {%t,ω} satisﬁes CP, VP, RP, DC and FS, then it admits this representation.
A.2 Dynamic Consistency
Lemma 6 Let {%t,ω} be a family of preferences on H for which there exist a scalar β>0,a n
unbounded aﬃne function u : X → R, and a dynamic ambiguity index {ct}, such that: for each
(t,ω) ∈ T× Ω, %t,ω is represented by:






βτ−tu(hτ)dp + ct (ω,p)

 ∀h ∈ H.
The following statements are equivalent:
(a) {%t,ω} satisfy DC.





q(G)ct+1(G,qG)+ m i n
p∈∆(Gt(ω)):p|Gt+1=q|Gt+1
ct(ω,p). (30)
22(c) For all t<T and ω ∈ Ω,
ct (ω,·)=co t (ω,·) (31)




q(G)ct+1(G,qG)+i n f p∈ri∆(Gt(ω)):p|Gt+1=q|Gt+1 ct(ω,p),f o ra l lq ∈
ri∆(Gt (ω)).
(d) Vt (ω,h)=u(ht (ω))+minr∈∆(Ω,Gt+1)
³R
βVt+1 (h)dr +m i n p∈∆(Gt(ω)):p|Gt+1=r ct(ω,p)
´
for
all t<T, ω ∈ Ω,a n dh ∈ H.
Proof. Like in the proof of Lemma 4, up to a cardinal transformation of u, we can assume
u(X) ∈ {R,R+,R++,R−,R−−}.F o rt h er e s to ft h ep r o o ft h ec a s eu(X)=R++ is considered (the
arguments we use can be easily adapted to the remaining ones). For all t ∈ T , ω ∈ Ω, ϕ ∈ RΩ,
y ∈ X T deﬁne
Jt (ω,ϕ) ≡ min
p∈∆(Gt(ω))
(hϕ,pi + ct (ω,p)) = inf
p∈ri ∆(Gt(ω))
(hϕ,pi + ct (ω,p)) (32)
and Ut (y) ≡ Vt (ω,y)=
P
τ≥t βτ−tu(yτ).T h e n Jt : RΩ → RΩ (Gt),w h e r eRΩ (Gt) the set
of all Gt-measurable functions. Notice that: (32) coincides with the property domct (ω,·) ∩
ri∆(Gt (ω)) 6= ∅ of dynamic ambiguity indexes; u(X)
Ω = {Ut ◦ h : h ∈ H} (see Lemma 4);
Vt (ω,h)=Jt (ω,Ut ◦ h) for all (t,ω,h) ∈ T× Ω ×Hand if t<T
Ut ◦ h = u ◦ ht + β (Ut+1 ◦ h) and Vt (h)=u ◦ ht + Jt (β (Ut+1 ◦ h)).23 (33)
Step 1. Let t<Tand ω ∈ Ω, Jt (ω,ξ)=m i n r∈∆(Ω,Gt+1)
³R





ξdr +i n f p∈ri∆(Gt(ω)):p|Gt+1=r ct(ω,p)
´
for all ξ ∈ RΩ (Gt+1).24
Proof. Denote by G = {G1,...,Gg} the set of all elements of Gt+1 contained in Gt (ω),a n db y
∆G the set ∆(Gt (ω),Gt+1) (brutally: the probabilities on Gt+1 with support in {G1,...,Gg}).
For all ξ =
P







i=1 ξGip(Gi)+ct,ω(p)] = minr∈∆G minp∈∆(Gt(ω)):p|Gt+1=r [
Pg
i=1 ξGip(Gi)+ct,ω(p)]
=m i n r∈∆G
³Pg
i=1 r(Gi)ξGi +m i n p∈∆(Gt(ω)):p|Gt+1=r ct,ω(p)
´
the observation that if r ∈ ∆(Ω,Gt+1)
\∆G there is G ∈ Gt+1 such that G * Gt (ω) with r(G) > 0 and hence there is no p ∈ ∆(Gt (ω))
such that p|Gt+1 = r delivers the ﬁrst equality. The second is proved in the same way. ¤
Step 2. Let t<T and ω ∈ Ω. The function γt (ω,·):∆(Ω,Gt+1) → [0,∞],d e ﬁned by
γt (ω,r) ≡ min
p∈∆(Gt(ω)):p|Gt+1=r
ct(ω,p) ∀r ∈ ∆(Ω,Gt+1),24
is closed, convex, grounded, and domγt (ω,·) ⊆ ∆(Gt (ω),Gt+1).
Proof. If r ∈ ∆(Ω,Gt+1)\∆(Gt (ω),Gt+1),t h e r ei sG ∈ Gt+1 such that G * Gt (ω) with r(G) > 0,
then there is no p ∈ ∆(Gt (ω)) such that p|Gt+1 = r and γt (ω,r)=∞. Therefore domγt (ω,r) ⊆
∆(Gt (ω),Gt+1)=∆G.F o rξ ∈ RΩ (Gt+1),b yS t e p1 ,Jt (ω,ξ)=m i n r∈∆(Ω,Gt+1)
¡R
ξdr + γt (ω,r)
¢
.
Hence, Jt (ω,0) = 0 implies that minr∈∆(Ω,Gt+1) γt (ω,r)=0 ,a n dγt (ω,·) is grounded. Let
r,s ∈ ∆G and α ∈ (0,1),t h e nγt (ω,αr +( 1− α)s)=m i n p∈∆(Gt(ω)):p|Gt+1=αr+(1−α)s ct(ω,p) ≤
min p,q∈∆(Gt(ω))
p|Gt+1=r,q|Gt+1=s
ct(ω,αp +( 1− α)q) ≤ min p,q∈∆(Gt(ω))
p|Gt+1=r,q|Gt+1=s
(αct(ω,p)+( 1− α)ct(ω,q)) =
αγt (ω,r)+( 1− α)γt (ω,s). Therefore γt (ω,·) is convex. Let b ∈ R and rn ∈ ∆G,b es u c h
that rn → r and γt (ω,rn) ≤ b for all n ≥ 1. For all n there exists ¯ pn such that γt (ω,rn)=
23In fact, for all ω ∈ Ω, (Ut ◦ h)(ω)= u(ht (ω)) +
S
τ≥t+1 βτ−tu(hτ (ω)) = (u ◦ ht)(ω)+
β
S
τ≥t+1 βτ−(t+1)u(hτ (ω)) = (u ◦ ht)(ω)+βUt+1 (h(ω)) = (u ◦ ht)(ω)+β (Ut+1 ◦ h)(ω) and
Vt (ω,h)=Jt (ω,Ut ◦ h)=Jt,ω (β (Ut+1 ◦ h)+u ◦ ht)=Jt,ω






(β (Ut+1 ◦ h)+u(ht (ω)))1Gt(ω)

= Jt,ω (β (Ut+1 ◦ h)+u(ht (ω))) = Jt,ω (β (Ut+1 ◦ h)) + u(ht (ω)).
24With the convention that the minimum over the empty set is ∞.
23minpn∈∆(Gt(ω)):pn
|Gt+1
=rn ct(ω,pn) ≤ ct(ω, ¯ pn) ≤ b and ¯ pn
|Gt+1 = rn. Take a convergent subsequence
¯ pnj → ¯ p of ¯ pn,s i n c ect(ω,·) is closed ct(ω, ¯ p) ≤ b,m o r e o v e r ,¯ p(G) = limj ¯ pnj (G) = limj rnj (G)=
r(G) for all G ∈ Gt+1.I nt u r nt h i si m p l i e sγt (ω,r) ≤ ct(ω, ¯ p) ≤ b and γt (ω,·) is closed. ¤
This implies that:





for all q ∈ ∆(Ω) is grounded, closed and convex with domνt (ω,·) ⊆ ∆(Gt (ω)).




q(G)ct+1(G,qG) for all q ∈ ∆(Gt (ω)),i sc l o s e da n dc o n v e x .
Proof. For later use (in the proof of Theorem 2) we just assume that ct+1 satisﬁes (i) and (ii)
of the deﬁnition of dynamic ambiguity index (not that {ct} is an ambiguity index itself). We
show that ηt (ω,·) is the closure of its convex restriction κt (ω,·) to ri∆(Gt (ω)).L e t G ≡
{G ∈ Gt+1 : G ⊆ Gt (ω)}. For all q,p ∈ ri∆(Gt (ω)), α ∈ (0,1),a n dG ∈ G,l e tµG ≡ αq (G)+
(1 − α)p(G) and αG ≡ αq (G)/µG ∈ (0,1). This delivers (αq +( 1− α)p)G = αGqG+(1− αG)pG
and then κt,ω (αq +( 1− α)p)=
P





G∈G µG (αGct+1,G (qG)+( 1− αG)ct+1,G (pG)) =
P
G∈G αq (G)ct+1,G (qG)+
(1 − α)p(G)ct+1,G (pG)=ακt,ω (q)+( 1− α)κt,ω (p), hence κt,ω is convex. For all G ∈ G,t h e r e
is pG ∈ ri∆(G) ∩ domct+1 (G,·). Therefore, choosing {q(G):G ∈ G} such that
P
G∈G q (G)=1
and q (G) > 0 for all G ∈ G, the probability r ≡
P
G∈G q (G)pG ∈ domκt,ω and κt,ω is proper.25
Take p ∈ ri (domκt,ω) and q ∈ ∆(Gt (ω)).I f G ∈ Gt+1 and q (G) > 0 then G ⊆ Gt (ω).I n
this case, the function f (α) ≡ αG has strictly positive ﬁrst derivative w.r.t. α in (0,1) and
limα↑1 f (α)=1 ;s i n c ep ∈ ri (domκt,ω),t h e npG ∈ domct+1(G,·), and [26, Cor. 7.5.1] implies
limα↑1 ct+1,G ((αq +( 1− α)p)G) = limα↑1 ct+1,G (αGqG +( 1− αG)pG)=l i m α↑1 ct+1,G (f (α)qG
+(1− f (α))pG)=ct+1,G (qG).E l s e i f G ∈ G and q(G)=0 ,t h e n(αq +( 1− α)p)G = pG for
all α ∈ (0,1), and hence limα↑1 ct+1,G ((αq +( 1− α)p)G) = limα↑1 ct+1,G (pG)=ct+1,G (pG),
with ct+1,G (pG) < ∞ since pG ∈ domct+1(G,·). Then, by [26, Thm. 7.5], (coκt,ω)(q)=
limα↑1 κt,ω ((1 − α)p + αq) = limα↑1
P




q(G)ct+1,G (qG)=ηt,ω (q) for all q ∈ ∆(Gt (ω)). ¤














Proof. First assume ϕ1,ϕ 2 ∈ u(X)
Ω.T h e r e e x i s t s ε>0 such that ϕi − ε ∈ u(X)
Ω,c h o o s e




βε. For all ω0 ∈ Ω,t h e r ee x i s t sx







ϕi (ω0) − ε
¢





ϕi(ω0) if τ = T.






































,t h e nh1 ∼t+1,ω0 h2;m o r e o v e rh1
τ = h2
τ for all τ ≤ t,t h e nD Ci m -
























for all ω0 ∈ Gt (ω),t h e r e
exist ψ1,ψ2 ∈ u(X)

























25Notice that for all G ∈ G, r(G)=q (G) and rG = pG.
24Step 6. Let t<T.I f{%t,ω} satisfy DC, then Jt (βJt+1 (ϕ)) = Jt (βϕ) for all ϕ ∈ RΩ.
Proof. Choose ω ∈ Ω, and remember that Jt+1 (ϕ)=
P
G∈Gt+1 Jt+1 (G,ϕ)1 G ∈ RΩ (Gt+1).
For all ω0 ∈ Gt (ω), domct+1,ω0 ⊆ ∆(Gt+1 (ω0)),t h e nJt+1 (ω0,ϕ)=Jt+1 (ω0,J t+1,ω0 (ϕ)1 Ω)=
Jt+1
¡
ω0,J t+1 (Gt+1 (ω0),ϕ)1 Gt+1(ω0)
¢
= Jt+1 (ω0,J t+1 (ϕ)), then, by Step 5 above, Jt (ω,βϕ)=
Jt (ω,βJt+1 (ϕ)). The proof is concluded by the observation that this is true for all ω ∈ Ω. ¤
Step 7. {%t,ω} satisfy DC if and only if Jt (βJt+1 (ϕ)) = Jt (βϕ) for all t<Tand ϕ ∈ RΩ.
Proof. By the previous step we just have to prove necessity. Let ω ∈ Ω and t<T .A s s u m e












































.L e t h1,h 2 ∈ H be such that h1
τ = h2
τ for all τ ≤ t and













for all ω0 ∈ Ω, whence















































Step 8. (a) ⇔ (d).
Proof. By Step 7, {%t,ω} satisfy DC iﬀ
Jt,ω (βJt+1 (ϕ)) = Jt,ω (βϕ) for all t<T,ϕ∈ RΩ,ω∈ Ω iﬀ
Jt,ω (βJt+1 (ψ + b)) = Jt,ω (β (ψ + b)) for all t<T, ψ ∈ u(X)
Ω, b ∈ R, ω ∈ Ω iﬀ
Jt,ω (βJt+1 (ψ)) + βb = Jt,ω (βψ)+βb for all t<T, ψ ∈ u(X)
Ω, b ∈ R, ω ∈ Ω iﬀ
Jt,ω (βJt+1 (ψ)) = Jt,ω (βψ) for all t<T, ψ ∈ u(X)
Ω, ω ∈ Ω iﬀ
Jt,ω (βJt+1 (Ut+1 ◦ h)) = Jt,ω (β (Ut+1 ◦ h)) for all t<T, h ∈ H, ω ∈ Ω iﬀ
Jt,ω (βVt+1 (h)) + u(ht (ω)) = Jt,ω (β (Ut+1 ◦ h)) + u(ht (ω)) for all t<T, h ∈ H, ω ∈ Ω iﬀ
minr∈∆(Ω,Gt+1)
³R
βVt+1 (h)dr +m i n p∈∆(Gt(ω)):p|Gt+1=r ct(ω,p)
´
+u(ht (ω)) = Vt (ω,h) for all t<
T, h ∈ H, ω ∈ Ω,b yGt+1 measurability of Vt+1 (h),S t e p1 ,a n d( 3 3 ) . ¤
Step 9. For all t<T, ω ∈ Ω,a n dϕ ∈ RΩ















25Proof. Denote by G = {G1,...,G g} the set {G ∈ Gt+1 : G ⊆ Gt (ω)}.B yS t e p s1a n d2 ,





























































































































































Last equality holds since ∆(Gt (ω)) =
© Pg
i=1 r(Gi)pi : r ∈ ∆G,p i ∈ ∆(Gi) ∀i =1 ,...,g
ª
,a n d
q ∈ ∆(Gt (ω)) c a nb ew r i t t e na sq =
P
i=1,...,g r(Gi)pi with r ∈ ∆G and pi ∈ ∆(Gi) if and only
if r = q|Gt+1 and pi = qGi for all i =1 ,...,g with q(Gi)=r(Gi) > 0 (clearly pi can be chosen
arbitrarily in ∆(Gi) if q (Gi)=r(Gi)=0 ). ¤
Steps 7 and 9 imply that {%t,ω} satisfy DC iﬀ for all t<T, ω ∈ Ω,a n dϕ ∈ RΩ














Eq. (32) and Lemma 1 guarantee that this is equivalent to ct (ω,·)=co(ηt (ω,·)+νt (ω,·)) where
ηt (ω,·) and νt (ω,·) are deﬁned in Steps 4 and 3. These steps also guarantee closure and convexity
of ηt (ω,·) and νt (ω,·).T h a ti s( a )⇔ (b).
(a) ⇔ (c) can be proved in a similar way. ¥
Remark 1 In particular, for a dynamic ambiguity index {ct} conditions (30) and (31) are equiv-
alent.
26A.3 Proof of Theorem 1
(a) ⇒ (b) By Proposition 3 and Lemma 5 there exist a scalar β>0, an unbounded aﬃne function
u : X → R, and a dynamic ambiguity index {ct}, such that: for each (t,ω) ∈ T× Ω, %t,ω is
represented by Vt (ω,h)=i n f p∈∆++(Ω)
³R P




for all h ∈ H.
Lemma 6 guarantees that (11) holds.
(b) ⇒ (a) Assume that there exist a scalar β>0,a nu n b o u n d e da ﬃne function u : X → R,
and a dynamic ambiguity index {ct}, such that: for each (t,ω) ∈ T× Ω, %t,ω is represented by
Vt (ω,h)=i n f p∈∆++(Ω)
³R P




for all h ∈ H.B yP r o p o s i t i o n
1, {%t,ω} satisfy CP, VP, RP, and FS., and so, by (11) and Lemma 6, {%t,ω} satisfy DC.
Uniqueness of the representation follows again from Proposition 1. ¥
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
(i) is trivial. Step 2 of the proof of Lemma 6 shows that γt (ω,·) is grounded, closed and convex,
with domγt (ω,·) ⊆ ∆(Gt (ω),Gt+1), for all t<Tand all ω ∈ Ω. It only remains to show
that and domγt (ω,·) ∩ ∆++ (Gt (ω),Gt+1) 6= ∅.T a k e p◦ ∈ ri∆(Gt (ω)) ∩ domct (ω,·),t h e n
r◦ = p◦
|Gt+1 ∈ ∆++ (Gt (ω),Gt+1) and γt (ω,r◦)=m i n p∈∆(Gt(ω)):p|Gt+1=r◦ ct(ω,p) ≤ ct(ω,p◦) < ∞.
¥
A.5 Proof of Theorem 2
(a) ⇒ (b) is an immediate consequence of the deﬁnition of recursive ambiguity index and Propo-
sition 2.
(b) ⇒ (a) The proof that {ct} is a dynamic ambiguity index is by backward induction. Clearly,
cT satisﬁes (i) and (ii) of the deﬁnition of dynamic ambiguity index. Next we assume that ct+1
(0 ≤ t<T )s a t i s ﬁes (i) and (ii) of the deﬁnition of dynamic ambiguity index, and show that ct
satisﬁes them.
By assumption, ct+1 : Ω × ∆(Ω) → [0,∞] is such that:
(i) ct+1 (·,p):Ω → [0,∞] is measurable w.r.t. Gt+1 for all p ∈ ∆(Ω),
(ii) ct+1 (ω,·):∆(Ω) → [0,∞] is grounded, closed and convex, with domct (ω,·) ⊆ ∆(Gt+1 (ω))
and domct+1 (ω,·) ∩ ∆++ (Gt+1 (ω)) 6= ∅, for all ω ∈ Ω.
Clearly, for all ω ∈ Ω, the function ct (ω,·) appearing in (b) is well deﬁned (since ct+1 satisﬁes
(i)) and ct (ω,·)=ct (ω0,·) if Gt (ω)=Gt (ω0).
Step 4 of the proof of Lemma 6 shows that for all ω ∈ Ω the function ηt (ω,·):∆(Gt (ω)) →




q(G)ct+1(G,qG) for all q ∈ ∆(Gt (ω)) is closed and convex.
Since q 7→ q|Gt+1 is aﬃne (and continuous) from ∆(Ω) to ∆(Ω,Gt,+1) and γt (ω,·):∆(Ω,Gt+1) →




is closed and convex on ∆(Ω) and its eﬀective domain is contained in ∆(Gt (ω)). We conclude
that, for all ω ∈ Ω, the function ct (ω,·) appearing in (b) is closed and convex, from ∆(Ω) to [0,∞],
with domct (ω,·) ⊆ ∆(Gt (ω)).
Next we show that ct (ω,·) is grounded. Choose arbitrarily ω ∈ Ω,t h e r ee x i s t sr ∈ ∆(Ω,Gt+1)
such that r(Gt (ω)) = 1 and γt (ω,r)=0 ;m o r e o v e r ,f o ra l lG ∈ Gt+1 there exists pG ∈ ∆(G) such
that ct+1(G,pG)=0 ,s e tq ≡
P














It remains to show that ri∆(Gt (ω)) ∩ domct (ω,·) 6= ∅ for all ω ∈ Ω. Choose arbitrarily ω ∈
Ω,t h e r ee x i s t sr ∈ ∆++ (Gt (ω),Gt+1) such that γt (ω,r) < ∞;m o r e o v e r ,f o ra l lG ∈ Gt+1 there ex-
ists pG ∈ ri∆(G) such that ct+1(G,pG) < ∞,s e tq ≡
P














∞. This concludes the proof that {ct} is a dynamic ambiguity index.







=0for all ω ∈
Ω, t<T ,a n dq ∈ ∆(Gt (ω)) (it is enough to take, for all G ∈ Gt+1, pG ∈ ∆(G) such that
ct+1(G,pG)=0and set p ≡
P























































= ct(ω,q) ∀ω ∈ Ω,t<T,q∈ ∆(Gt (ω)).
Hence {ct} satisﬁes condition (11) and it is a recursive ambiguity index.




=m i n p∈∆(Gt(ω)):p|Gt+1=q|Gt+1 ct(ω,p) for all
ω ∈ Ω, t<T ,a n dq ∈ ∆(Gt (ω)), which implies (13) for r ∈ ∆(Gt (ω),Gt+1).I f r/ ∈
∆(Gt (ω),Gt+1),t h e nγt (ω,r)=∞ =m i n p∈∆(Gt(ω)):p|Gt+1=r ct(ω,p) (the ﬁrst equality descend-
ing from the deﬁnition of one-period-ahead ambiguity index, the second from the convention we
adopted for minima over the empty set). We can conclude that (13) holds for all r ∈ ∆(Ω,Gt+1)
and that {γt} is unique. ¥
A.6 Proof of Corollary 1
It is easy to see that the eﬀect of MP(ii) on the representation provided by Proposition 1 is
guaranteeing that, for every t ∈ T and ω ∈ Ω, ct (ω,p)=δCt(ω) (p), for a closed and convex subset
Ct (ω) ⊆ ∆(Ω).
The relation domct,ω ⊆ ∆(Gt (ω)) implies Ct (ω) ⊆ ∆(Gt (ω)).D e n o t e b y G = {G1,...,Gg}
the set of all elements of Gt+1 contained in Gt (ω), and write indiﬀerently Ci or Ct+1 (Gi).L e t
ω ∈ Ω and t<T. Condition (11) is equivalent to
Ct (ω)=
(
q ∈ ∆(Gt (ω))









q ∈ ∆(Gt (ω))












¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯















¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
r ∈ ∆G,p i ∈ ∆(Gi) ∀i =1 ,...,g,
δCi(pi)=0for all i s.t. r(Gi) > 0,










¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
r ∈ ∆G,p i ∈ ∆(Gi) ∀i =1 ,...,g,
pi ∈ Ci for all i =1 ,...,g,








¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
pi ∈ Ct+1 (Gi) for all i =1 ,...,g,





¯ ¯ ¯pG ∈ Ct+1 (G) ∀G ∈ Gt+1 and r ∈ Ct (ω)|Gt+1
o
. ¥
A.7 Proof of Theorem 3
W.l.o.g., set θ =1and denote by q◦ the reference probability of the statement. The properties of
the relative entropy (see, e.g., [20]) guarantee that {ct} (as deﬁned by (17)) is a dynamic ambiguity
index. By Theorem 1, we only have to show that {ct} satisﬁes (11) or the equivalent (31), see
Remark 1.





q(G)ct+1,G(qG)+ i n f
p∈ri∆(Gt(ω)):p|Gt+1=q|Gt+1
ct,ω(p). (35)













where pω0 ≡ p(ω0) and q◦
Gt(ω),ω0 ≡ q◦
Gt(ω) (ω0). For all G ∈ Gt+1 such that G ⊆ Gt (ω) and all
















plify the notation, set S = Gt (ω), ¯ q = q◦
S, G = {G ∈ Gt+1 : G ⊆ Gt (ω)} (notice that G is a
























¯ qs − log
q(G)

























































Moreover, for all q ∈ ri∆(Gt (ω)), infp∈ri∆(Gt(ω)):p|Gt+1=q|Gt+1 ct,ω(p)=i n f p∈ri∆(S):p|G=q|G ct,ω(p)
is the value of the problem 
       













s∈G ps = q (G) ∀G ∈ G.
(37)










s∈G ps = q (G) ∀G ∈ G
(38)
and observe that the solution p◦ is unique, it is a strictly positive vector (this is also required













G∈G q (G)=1 , and obviously the









s∈G ps − q(G)
¢
,d e n o t i n gb yG(s) the element of







+1− λG(s) =0 ∀s ∈ S
P










s∈G ps = q(G) ∀G ∈ G
(40)
then the observation that G(s)=G(w) for all s ∈ G(w) implies
(




















































































which together with Eq. (36) delivers Eq. (35).









q(G)ct+1,G(qG)+i n f p∈ri∆(Gt(ω)):p|Gt+1=q|Gt+1 ct,ω(p) if q ∈ ri∆(Gt (ω))
∞ otherwise





=r i ( ∆(Gt (ω))), by [26, Thm. 7.5], for all p ∈ ∆(Gt (ω)),
co t,ω (p) = lim
λ↑1
 t,ω ((1 − λ)q + λp) = lim
λ↑1
ct,ω ((1 − λ)q + λp)=ct,ω (p). (45)
Since Eq. (45) is a fortiori true if p/ ∈ ∆(Gt (ω)), condition (31) holds, as wanted.






(t,ω,p) ∈ T× Ω × ∆(Ω).F i xω ∈ Ω and t<T. Step 4 of the proof of Lemma 6 shows that there









(αq +( 1− α)p)(G)ct+1,G ((αq +( 1− α)p)G).
Moreover, by deﬁnition of ct,ω, ∞ >c t,ω (q) = limα↑1 ct,ω (αq +( 1− α)p).S i n c e{ct} is a recursive



















where qαp = αq +












(αq +( 1− α)p)(G)log




































for all r ∈ ∆(Ω,Gt+1). By (12), this implies (18). ¥
A . 8 P r o o f so fT h e o r e m s4a n d5
We ﬁrst prove Theorem 5. Choose ω ∈ Ω, t<T,a n df ∈ F.F i r s to b s e r v et h a ti fe and ¯ e belong to
Et, e(t,ω)=¯ e(t,ω),a n de(t +1 ,ω0)=¯ e(t +1 ,ω0) for all ω0 ∈ Gt (ω), then, by CP, Vt (ω,f + e)=
Vt (ω,f +¯ e). Therefore, ∂Vt (ω,f)={(k,m) ∈ R × M(Gt (ω),Gt+1):V 0
t (ω,f;e) ≤ ket (ω)+
β
R
et+1dm for all e ∈ E (t,ω)} where E (t,ω) is the set of all {Gt}-adapted processes e such that
e(τ,ω0)=0if τ 6= t,t +1or ω0 / ∈ Gt (ω).
For all e ∈ E (t,ω):I ft = T −1,t h e nVt+1 (ω0,f+ e)=VT (ω0,f+ e)=u(fT (ω0)+eT (ω0)) for
all ω0 ∈ Ω;s e tϕ(ω0)=0for all ω0 ∈ Ω,a n dg e tVt+1 (ω0,f+ e)=u(ft+1 (ω0)+et+1 (ω0))+ϕ(ω0).




Vt+2 (f + e)dp + γt+1 (ω0,p)
¢
=




Vt+2 (f)dp + γt+1 (ω0,p)
¢
for all ω0 ∈ Ω,w h e r et h e
last equality descends from CP and the fact that fτ +eτ = fτ for all τ ≥ t+2. Gt+1-measurability





Vt+2 (f)dp + γt+1 (ω0,p)
¢
for all ω0 ∈ Ω.A l s oi nt h i sc a s e ,
Vt+1 (ω0,f+ e)=u(ft+1 (ω0)+et+1 (ω0)) + ϕ(ω0) ∀ω0 ∈ Ω. (46)
Denote by G = {G1,...,Gg} the set of all elements of Gt+1 contained in Gt (ω),b y∆G
(resp. M(G))t h es e t∆(Gt (ω),Gt+1) (resp. M(Gt (ω),Gt+1)), by   f =( f0,f 1,...,fg) the vector
(ft (ω),f t+1 (G1),...,ft+1 (Gg)) for all f ∈ F,b y  m =( m1,...,mg) the vector (m(G1),...,m(Gg))
for all m ∈ M(G),a n db y  ϕ =( ϕ1,...,ϕ g) the vector (ϕ(G1),...,ϕ(Gg)).
Notice that e 7→   e deﬁnes a linear isomorphism between E (t,ω) and Rg+1, and set for all
  e =( e0,...,e g) ∈ Rg+1





Vt+1 (f + e)dr + γt (ω,r)
¶





[u(ft+1 (ω0)+et+1 (ω0)) + ϕ(ω0)]dr (ω0)+γt (ω,r)
¶




β (u(fi + ei)+ϕi)ri + γt (ω,r)
!
.
Moreover, (k,m) ∈ ∂Vt (ω,f) iﬀ limλ↓0 λ−1 [Vt (ω,f + λe) − Vt (ω,f)] ≤ ket (ω)+β
R
et+1dm for
all e ∈ E (t,ω) iﬀ limλ↓0 λ−1
h






i=1 βmiei for all   e ∈ Rg+1 iﬀ (k,β  m)




of F at   0.
For each j =0 ,1,...,g,c o n s i d e r :
• the concave function φj : Rg+1 → R deﬁned by φj (  e) ≡ βj (u(fj + ej)+ϕj) for all   e ∈ Rg+1,
with the convention ϕ0 ≡ 0,β 0 ≡ 1,β j ≡ β if j =1 ,...,g;
• the row vector Aj corresponding to the projection on the j-th component;
• the function βju + βjϕj : R → R.
31Then φj (  e)=( βju + βjϕj) ◦ (Aj + fj)(   e) and, by [16, Vol. I Thm. VI.4.2.1],
∂φj (  e)=AT
j ∂ (βju + βjϕj)((Aj + fj)(   e))
= AT
j βj∂u(fj + ej)=

      
      









     

¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
u0 (fj + ej) ∈ ∂u(fj + ej)

      
      
.
Consider the function Φ : Rg+1 → R deﬁned by Φ(  v) ≡ v0 +m i n r∈∆G (
Pg
i=1 viri + γt (ω,r)).I ti s
easy to check that Φ is concave, monotonic, and
∂Φ(  v)=

   











¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯




viri + γt (ω,r)
!

   
   
.




      













     

¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
ρ ∈ argminr∈∆G (
Pg
i=1 (β (u(fi)+ϕi))ri + γt (ω,r))
u0 (fi) ∈ ∂u(fi) ∀i =0 ,...,g

      
      
=

   











¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
ρ ∈ argminr∈∆G (
Pg
i=1 (β (u(fi)+ϕi))ri + γt (ω,r))
u0 (fi) ∈ ∂u(fi) ∀i =0 ,...,g

   








¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯





(u(ft+1 (ω0)) + ϕ(ω0))dr (ω0)+γt (ω,r)
¢
,





which together with (46) (i.e. u(ft+1)+ϕ = Vt+1 (f)) delivers (21), and concludes the proof of
Theorem 5.
The proof of Theorem 4 starts with the observation that, for every ω ∈ Ω, t<T,a n df ∈ F,
V 0








is a singleton iﬀ ∂Vt (ω,f) is a singleton. If u is
diﬀerentiable and γt (ω) is essentially strictly convex, then [26, Thm. 26.3] guarantees that




viri + γt (ω,r)
!
∀(v1,...,vg) ∈ Rg (47)
is diﬀerentiable, and hence Φ and F are diﬀerentiable. Conversely, if u is not diﬀerentiable,





Then diﬀerentiability of Vt (ω) implies diﬀerentiability of u.I f γt (ω) is not essentially strictly

















i ri + γt (ω,r)).S i n c eu(R) is unbounded, there are f ∈ F and b ∈ R such that
32β (u(fi)+ϕi)=v◦
i +b for i =1 ,...,g.T h e nρ, ¯ ρ ∈ argminr∈∆G (
Pg
i=1 (β (u(fi)+ϕi))ri + γt (ω,r)),


























,w h i c hi sa b s u r d . ¥
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